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Executive Summary 
 
 
1. This note provides an overview of demographic changes in Azerbaijan and their policy 
implications. Azerbaijan’s population is younger than the populations of most countries in the 
region.  It is estimated that the population in Azerbaijan will increase from about 7.2 million in 
1990 to 10.6 million by 2050. Nevertheless, Azerbaijan is beginning to experience the aging of 
its population, after having undergone a dramatic decline in fertility from about 5.5 children per 
woman in the 1950s, to just over two children per woman at present. This trend, combined with 
increasing life expectancy, underlies the growing rise in the percentage of elderly persons, and 
the eventual slowdown in the growth of the working-age population. This note provides an 
overview of key demographic changes unfolding in Azerbaijan, highlights their linkages with 
social spending, and draws policy implications for labor force participation, productivity, and 
ultimately for Azerbaijan’s development and poverty reduction trajectory.  
 
2.   The looming demographic changes in Azerbaijan have serious implications for 
growth, poverty reduction, and fiscal policies in the long-term. The rising share of elderly 
persons in the population will lead to increased fiscal obligations for pensions and other 
programs that are utilized primarily by older Azerbaijanis. This spending is necessary to prevent 
the impoverishment of the elderly population, who may not have any other sources of income. 
However, if the demographic transition is not well-managed, the rise in spending on the elderly 
could drain fiscal and administrative resources away from other generations, and thus damage 
the growth prospects for Azerbaijan’s economy. The only sustainable strategy for durable 
poverty reduction lies in economic growth—therefore, finding the right balance between 
enhancing the productivity of the young and supporting the living standards of the elderly 
becomes an essential objective for Azerbaijan’s long-term prosperity. The note provides a 
number of policy options that may help relax the constraint that will be imposed by demographic 
forces over the next several decades.  
 
3. The working-age population of Azerbaijan is growing, but at a slower rate than 
previously, and with projections showing that this growth may eventually turn negative. The 
labor force participation rate in Azerbaijan is 67% for men and 60% for women.  These rates 
compare favorably with other countries in the region. The note presents simulations of the 
evolution of the total labor force in Azerbaijan.  These simulations suggest that the total labor 
force is likely to increase from about 4.17 million to 4.75 million between 2008 and 2020.  Given 
these favorable demographic conditions, Azerbaijan has more time than most other countries in 
the region to prepare for the future demographic shifts. It is advisable for the government to use 
that time to implement policies that can help alleviate the demographic pressures that will 
eventually arrive. This slowdown could be tempered or even reversed through proactive policies, 
such as raising the retirement age for women up to that of men, and providing outside dependent 
care options to enable current caregivers to enter the labor market. The persistently high 
unemployment rate in Azerbaijan indicates the need for faster job creation and investment in 
active labor market programs, such as job search assistance and training/re-training. Any 
impending decline in the share of the working-age population could be mitigated by proactive 
policies aimed at increasing formal labor market participation, linking the unemployed with jobs, 
and activating individuals who are out of the labor force. Another policy that could help promote 
vii 
 
higher participation rates—and at the same time reduce the fiscal burden on the pension 
system—would be to equalize the pension age eligibility for men and women. As of 2009, the 
statutory retirement age was 62 for men and 57 for women—this despite the fact that the life 
expectancy for women is almost five years longer than for men. Another step that could help to 
increase female labor force participation would be the development of affordable quality child 
care and dependent care services.  
 
4. In addition to raising the participation rate, it could also be valuable to take proactive 
measures to improve labor productivity. Improvements in labor productivity can arise from a 
better educated and more flexible workforce, a more effective use of technology, and better 
matching between worker skills and jobs. Reforming the education system would play a major 
role in this effort. In Azerbaijan, working-age able-bodied adults with post-secondary education 
are less likely to be unemployed or inactive. Other measures that could increase labor 
productivity include adult education and life-long learning opportunities to maintain and enhance 
workers’ skills.  Growing international evidence indicates that successful early childhood 
development programs offer potentially the highest rates of return on human capital investments. 
In Azerbaijan, however, enrollment in any form of pre-school program appears to be quite low, 
at about 9%. This implies that Azerbaijan would be well-advised to target a larger amount of its 
social spending on its youngest citizens.  
 
5. Azerbaijan’s social spending systems are not currently facing serious fiscal 
sustainability issues, but the projected demographic changes may eventually put a strain on 
the country’s pension and healthcare systems. As of 2008, the pension system dependency rate 
(pensioners to contributors) was 83%, which is high compared to other countries in the ECA 
region. In the coming decades, the increase in the percentage of elderly persons and the 
slowdown in the growth of the working-age population will increase the burden on the pension 
system. The impact of an aging population on health costs does not appear to threaten the 
sustainability of the system. All the same, given the relatively low level of government spending 
on health in Azerbaijan, spending on this sector should probably be increased in the near-term.  
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I. Introduction 
 
 
1. Although Azerbaijan is younger than many other countries in the region, it is already 
beginning to experience the “graying” of its population. Most of Azerbaijan’s neighbors are 
already experiencing the consequences of demographic changes characterized by aging 
populations, and in some cases, falling populations. The demographic pressures in Azerbaijan 
are not yet as strong. However, an awareness of demographic trends and their ramifications is 
essential to inform decision-making and allow for proactive policies on a wide range of 
economic and social issues. This policy note provides an overview of key demographic trends in 
Azerbaijan, and explores the implications of those trends for the labor market, social spending, 
and poverty.   
 
2. The major driver of Azerbaijan’s demographic shift is an aging population.  The 
country has already undergone a dramatic decline in its fertility rate, which fell from about 5.5 
children per woman in the 1950s to the present level of just over 2 children per woman. This 
trend, combined with increasing life expectancy, underlies the evolution in the age structure of 
Azerbaijan’s population, which is depicted in Figure 1. The two main demographic changes 
evident from these trends are a rise in the percentage of elderly persons, and a slowdown and 
eventual shrinkage of the working-age population.  
 
Figure 1: Demographic trends and key policy issues in Azerbaijan 
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3. The population shifts depicted in Figure 1 raise important issues regarding 
Azerbaijan’s growth prospects and poverty reduction policies.  With fewer people of working 
age expected to support a growing percentage of elderly persons, policymakers should consider a 
number of policy questions.  These include: (i) how to balance poverty-reduction policies aimed 
at different stages of the life cycle; (ii) how to ensure that future productivity gains compensate 
for the slowdown and eventual shrinkage of the working-age population; and (iii) how to 
maintain the fiscal sustainability of pension and health programs as the share of older people 
continues to rise. 
 
4. The demographic trends in Azerbaijan are favorable at present, but it would be prudent 
for policymakers to prepare for the impending demographic changes. Unlike many countries in 
the region, Azerbaijan has the time and significant policy space to mitigate the future impacts of 
these changes on Azerbaijan’s development trajectory. Policy levers are available to promote 
labor market participation and productivity to counter rising dependency ratios; education 
systems—including early childhood education—can be strengthened to support these efforts; and 
measures can be taken to ensure that pension and health spending is sustainable. Moreover, 
targeting these proactive policies to the most vulnerable segments of the population is likely to 
deliver the greatest impact on both the current and future well-being of the nation. These issues 
are summarized in Table 1.  
 
Table 1: Looking at Demographic Changes in Azerbaijan through a Poverty Lens 
Demographic trend Key policy challenges Linkages with social policies  
Shrinking working 
age population 
Promoting labor force  
participation 
 Dependent care options (e.g., long-term 
care and child care) 
 Linking the unemployed with jobs  
 Raising retirement ages 
Raising labor force  
productivity 
 Early childhood education  
 Lifelong learning  
 Active labor market programs  
Rising elderly  
population 
Containing pension cost 
pressures 
 Choosing benefit levels, retirement age 
 Adequate replacement rates, social 
pensions  
Containing health system 
cost pressures 
 Enabling access to care by lowering out-
of-pocket payments 
 Service delivery reforms 
 
 
5. The remainder of the note is structured as follows: Section II summarizes the key 
demographic trends underway in Azerbaijan; Section III analyzes the four policy issues as 
depicted in column 2 of Table 1.  In each case, the poverty reduction angle is emphasized. The 
final section provides a summary of the key messages.         
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II. Demographic Trends 
 
6. Azerbaijan is younger than most countries in the Europe and Central Asia region—
and it has a growing population. In 1990, Azerbaijan’s population was 7.2 million; by 2050, it 
is expected to grow to 10.6 million—which represents an increase of 47% (see Figure 2). This is 
in sharp contrast to Azerbaijan’s two neighbors, Russia and Georgia, whose populations are 
expected to shrink by 15% and 22%, respectively, over the same period. In this respect 
Azerbaijan is more similar to its other neighbor, Turkey, where the population is also projected 
to grow (see Figure 3). 
 
Figure 2: Total Population of Azerbaijan, 1990-
2050 
 
 
Figure 3: Population size in Azerbaijan and 
the Region, 1950-2050 
 
 
Note:  “Eastern Europe” includes Belarus, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, 
Hungary, Moldova, Poland, Romania, Russia, Slovakia and Ukraine. 
 
 
7. Azerbaijan’s growing population is largely a result of its fertility rate, which is 
relatively high compared to most countries in the region. Figure 4 shows that in 1950 
Azerbaijan’s fertility rate—at 5.5 children per woman—was much higher than the fertility rate in 
Georgia or other Eastern European countries.  Albeit, it was still lower than the fertility rate in 
Turkey. The fertility rate in Azerbaijan has experienced a dramatic decline since 1960. It is 
currently somewhat higher than the regional average, but it is expected to stabilize at about 2 
children per woman over the next few decades. An additional, but more recent trend in 
Azerbaijan is the emergence of skewed sex ratios (the number of male per female births); this 
currently stands at 1.16 in Azerbaijan, as compared to 1.06 in Eastern Europe, and 1.05 in the 
west.  The long-term implications of this trend are unclear.
1
     
 
                                                 
1
 See Mesléet al. (2007), who attribute this to sex-selective abortions which are prevalent among third births.   A 
skewed sex ratio has been proposed as a cause of China’s high savings rate (Wei and Zhang 2009).  
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Figure 4: Total Fertility in Azerbaijan and the Region, 1950-2050 
 
Note:  “Eastern Europe” includes Belarus, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Hungary, Moldova, Poland, Romania, Russia, 
Slovakia and Ukraine. 
 
 
8. Moderate increases in longevity have also contributed to Azerbaijan’s growing 
population. Life expectancy in Azerbaijan has increased by about 5 years (or 7%) since the 
1970s— with higher gains for men than for women.  This increase is to that of Azerbaijan’s 
neighbors, but it is much lower than the increase in most countries in East Asia or Latin 
America.
2
 The future trend in life expectancy in Azerbaijan is quite uncertain—it will depend on 
investments by government and households both inside and outside the health sector.   
 
9. Low fertility rates and gradual increases in longevity are the main factors underlying 
Azerbaijan’s most important demographic trend: an aging population.  The median age in 
Azerbaijan has risen only modestly in the last 60 years: from 22.8 in 1950, to 28.4 in 2010. 
However, the pace of aging is projected to accelerate, with the median age reaching 40.6 by 
2050.  Figure 5 shows the predicted evolution of four age groups between 1990 and 2050, with 
respect to both population count and share of the population. During this span, the population 
share of the 0-14 age group is expected to fall from 34% to 17%. Although the working-age 
population of Azerbaijan is still growing in absolute size, and stabilizes by 2050, this group’s 
share in the population is currently at its peak of 70%, and it will fall to 65% by the end of the 
projection period. By contrast, the population shares of the 65+ and particularly the 80+ age 
groups will rise significantly.   
 
                                                 
2
 Rajaratnam et al. (2010), “Worldwide mortality in men and women aged 15-59 years from 1970 to 2010: A 
systematic analysis”.  Lancet 375: 1704-1720.   
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Figure 5: Evolution of population age groups in Azerbaijan, 1990-2050 
  
  
Source: UN  
 
 
10. The trends of shrinking younger age groups and expanding older age groups will 
result in higher dependency ratios, which have significant policy implications. After some 
years of a declining dependency ratio,
3
 Azerbaijan is currently at a turning point—with the total 
dependency ratio expected to increase from 44 dependents per 100 persons of working age in 
2010 to 54 dependents per 100 persons of working age by 2050. The observed fall in the total 
dependency ratio reflected the dynamics of falling fertility.  The projected rise will be entirely 
due to the rising old-age dependency ratio, because the child dependency ratio is forecasted to 
continue its decline (see Figure 6).   
 
                                                 
3
 The total dependency ratio is the ratio of the sum of the population aged 0-14 and that aged 65+ to the population 
aged 15-64. The child dependency ratio is the ratio of the population aged 0-14 to the population aged 15-64. The 
old-age dependency ratio is the ratio of the population aged 65 years or over to the population aged 15-64. All ratios 
are presented as number of dependents per 100 persons of working age (15-64). 
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Figure 6: Projected Dependency Ratios in Azerbaijan, 1990-2050 
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III. Policy Issues 
 
3.1. Increasing labor force participation, reducing unemployment, and raising labor 
productivity 
 
11. Unlike most other countries in the region, Azerbaijan is fortunate in having a growing 
working-age population. However, this growth is slowing down and will eventually turn 
negative. Proactive policy options should be considered to compensate for this impending 
demographic change. These policies would be aimed at: (i) raising labor force participation rates; 
(ii) stimulating stronger attachments to the formal labor market; (iii) linking the unemployed 
with jobs; and (iv) boosting worker productivity through an improved education system and 
opportunities for life-long learning.   
 
12. Overall, the labor force participation rate in Azerbaijan compares quite favorably with 
other countries in the region.  Among persons in the 15-64 age group, it is currently about 67% 
for men and 60% for women—about 63% overall (see Table 2). These rates are higher than the 
rates in Europe and Turkey, and slightly lower than those in Georgia and Russia, primarily due to 
lower participation rates by men. Figure 7 shows labor force participation by age group—with 
the familiar inverted U-shape: the youngest and oldest groups are least likely to be in the labor 
market. The ILO projects fairly stable labor force participation rates over the next ten years.   
  
8 
 
 
Table 2: Labor Force Participation Rates in Azerbaijan and the Region 
Azerbaijan: Labor force 
participation rates, 1990-2020 
    Men Women Total 
1990 74.0 59.4 66.4 
1995 70.0 53.9 61.6 
2000 71.3 57.2 63.9 
2005 68.4 59.4 63.6 
2010 66.7 59.7 63.0 
2015 63.8 67.5 60.5 
2020 63.6 67.5 60.0 
 
ECA: Labor force participation rates, 
2009 
  Men Women Total 
Azerbaijan 66.8 59.5 63.0 
EU-27 66.4 51.8 58.9 
EU-10 64.4 50.1 56.9 
Russia 73.6 62.9 67.8 
Turkey 69.3 23.7 46.5 
Georgia 73.8 55.1 63.7 
    
 
 
Source: ILO  
 
 
Figure 7: Age Profile of Labor Force Participation Rates in Azerbaijan, 2008 
 
 
 
13. Some basic simulations provide an indication of the potential evolution of the labor 
force in Azerbaijan under alternative scenarios. Figure 8 shows a baseline ILO scenario for 
labor force participation, under which the total number of workers rises from about 4.17 million 
to 4.75 million between 2008 and 2020. This increase could be even larger—with the labor force 
reaching 4.97 million workers—if the government could achieve even a slight and gradual 
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could be achieved either by activating individuals who are out of the labor force altogether, or by 
encouraging movement of individuals from the informal to the formal sector. One potential 
policy lever in this regard would be to adjust the level of labor taxation, because higher labor 
taxes can discourage both inactive and informally-employed individuals from joining the formal 
sector.   
 
 
Figure 8: Labor Force Participation Projections under Alternative Scenarios, 2008-2020 
 
 
 
14. Another option for sustaining higher participation rates would be to equalizing the 
pension age eligibility for men and women.  As of 2009, the statutory retirement age was 62 for 
men and 57 for women, despite the fact that life expectancy for women is almost five years 
longer.  Living Standards Measurement Survey (LSMS) data from 2008 indicate that about 67% 
of women aged 52 to 56 were economically active, while only 55% of women aged 57 to 61 
remain so.  This drop-off in labor force participation could be reduced by raising the mandated 
retirement age for women. Currently, early pensions are provided to men aged 57 with 12.6 years 
of work in unhealthy conditions, and to women aged 52 with 10 years of work in unhealthy 
conditions as well as mothers with three children or one disabled child. If the government is 
willing to consider raising the ages for early pensions or revising the list of qualifying 
occupations, this could also expand the labor force.  
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15. There is some evidence that the presence of a pensioner or a young child in the 
household is associated with a lower probability of labor force participation for working-age 
able-bodied family members—even after controlling for other factors. This pattern may be due 
to a perceived need to stay at home to take care of children and the elderly. Therefore, greater 
access and availability of health and long-term care services could have a positive impact on 
labor force participation by younger family members who would otherwise be preoccupied with 
care-giving roles. In addition, the development of improved access to child care services may 
help to increase female labor force participation. A regression analysis based on LSMS 2008 
data revealed that women with young children (0-5) are 19% less likely to be economically 
active, as compared to women of similar age, education, and household composition. While this 
may be partly explained by a woman’s choice to stay at home and raise children, another 
potential cause may be a lack of quality and affordable child care options. Indeed, about one-
third of working-age able-bodied women not currently in employment reported child care as the 
reason for not engaging in a job search. Therefore, improving the quality and accessibility of 
child care programs can serve both the current and the future needs of Azerbaijan’s economy: in 
the short-term, it could enable more Azerbaijani women to enter the labor force; in the longer-
term the investment in early childhood development could result in more productive workers—
and thus, faster growth. 
 
16. Unemployment—in particular, youth unemployment—wastes the human capital 
resources of Azerbaijan. As of 2008, the overall unemployment rate (using the ILO definition of 
unemployment) was manageable at 5.6% for those in the labor force aged 15 and over. At the 
same time, the unemployment rate of 15-24 year olds stood at 16% (see Figure 10). This 
magnitude of youth unemployment is not out of the ordinary, but it does suggest that young 
Azerbaijanis have a difficult time transitioning from school to work. Therefore, support and 
funding for active labor market policies that assist the young unemployed with training and job 
searching, could improve utilization of human resources in Azerbaijan’s economy. In addition, 
measures to improve Azerbaijan’s investment climate could also have positive long-term impacts 
on labor productivity.  The 2008 EBRD-World Bank Business Environment and Enterprise 
Performance Survey (BEEPS) revealed that the three biggest obstacles perceived by Azerbaijani 
firms are: (i) corruption; (ii) access to land; and (iii) high tax rates (World Bank and EBRD 
2010). Reducing corruption, improving access to land, and lowering the tax burden should 
encourage firms to create more jobs for unemployed Azerbaijanis. 
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Figure 9: Unemployment Rate in Azerbaijan, by Age Group 
 
 
17. In addition to raising the sheer number of employed Azerbaijanis, proactive measures 
could also be adopted to improve the productivity of these workers. Indeed, accelerating growth 
in labor productivity can substitute for the slowing labor supply growth. Improvements in labor 
productivity can arise from a better educated and more flexible workforce, more effective uses of 
technology by individual workers, and better matching between worker skills and jobs. A key 
step for improving worker productivity would be reform of the education system.  Figure 11 
reveals that working-age able-bodied adults with post-secondary education are much less likely 
to be unemployed or inactive.  
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Figure 10: Education and Labor Market Status in Azerbaijan 
 
 
 
18. Given the upcoming changes in the age structure, equity issues, and Azerbaijan’s 
future growth and development considerations, investments in the youngest members of the 
society become critical. An emerging body of literature has identified the strong linkages 
between early-childhood experiences and later life outcomes, including educational achievement, 
employment, and health outcomes.
4
 Indeed, as a general rule, “the earlier the better” appears to 
hold true with regard to the impact of programs aimed at skills development.  Rates of return for 
the early-childhood period are estimated to be significantly higher than for the primary-school-
age period, which in turn is better than for programs aimed at youth or young adults. In 2008, 
Azerbaijan spent only about 6.4% of its education budget on both pre-school and primary 
education. Enrollment in any form of pre-school program appears to be quite low, at about 9% 
(UNICEF).
5
  
 
19. The quality of the basic education system in Azerbaijan should also attract the attention 
of policymakers. In the latest round of the OECD Programme for International Student 
Assessment (PISA 2009), Azerbaijani students scored significantly below the OECD average on 
all three assessed subjects: mathematics, reading, and science. Moreover, as shown in the left 
panel of Figure 11, Azerbaijani students performed worse than all other ECA countries except 
                                                 
4
 See, for example, Almond and Currie (2010), “Human Capital Development before Age 5”. NBER.   
5
 Pre-school programs include public nursery schools for children aged 0-3, and public kindergartens for children 
aged 3-5. 
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for Kyrgyzstan on reading and science. Most ECA countries in the sample are at a higher level of 
economic development than Azerbaijan.  However, the right panel of Figure 11 indicates that 
Azerbaijan’s results were lower than predicted by its level of economic development. Therefore, 
in order to improve the productivity of its workforce, Azerbaijan needs to raise the quality of the 
education that will be obtained by its next generation.  
 
Figure 11: Results from the 2009 Programme for International Student Assessment (PISA) 
  
 
 
20. Besides their growth-enhancing potential, social programs targeting the youngest 
Azerbaijanis can make a key contribution towards achieving “equality of opportunity.” In 
Azerbaijan, as elsewhere, life chances are often strongly influenced by circumstances beyond the 
control of the individual.  For example, there is a spatial dimension: poverty rates are 
significantly higher in rural areas and in particular regions (e.g., Daghlyg Shirvan). There is also 
a strong inter-generational channel: poverty headcounts are about two-thirds higher in 
households in which the highest education level achieved is secondary or below (as opposed to 
those with members holding either vocational or higher education degrees)—a factor beyond the 
control of the children in the household. The notion that poverty is caused by much more than 
just individual effort is well-supported by the Azerbaijani population: only 11% attributed the 
existence of poverty to “laziness and lack of willpower”, whereas 61% pointed to “injustice in 
society” or being “an absence of luck”.6   
 
21. While investments in the young have the highest returns, other productivity-enhancing 
measures include adult education and so-called “life-long learning” opportunities for those 
who have already graduated from formal education, but need to maintain and enhance their 
skills. These programs are best targeted toward the poor, who have a lower educational 
attainment (see Figure 12).  
                                                 
6
 World Bank-EBRD Life in Transition Survey, 2007.   
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Figure 12: Education of Working-Age Able-Bodied Adults by Consumption Quintile 
 
 
 
22. Azerbaijan has more time than most other countries in the region to prepare for the 
forthcoming changes in its labor force. It is advisable for the government to use that time to 
implement proactive policies that can help alleviate demographic pressures when they do arise. 
Policies that should be considered in this regard include: (i) investments in early childhood 
development; (ii) life-long learning; and (iii) active labor market programs. Participation in the 
formal labor force can be encouraged through adjusting labor taxes and equalizing the statutory 
retirement ages for men and women. Finally, the design of social transfer programs should be 
examined for the presence of labor disincentives. 
 
3.2. Fiscal sustainability of pensions and health care 
 
23. In the next few decades, Azerbaijan will start experiencing an increase in its 
dependency ratio, which was at its historically lowest point in 2010. More elderly individuals 
per worker could have significant implications for the fiscal sustainability of social spending in 
Azerbaijan in the years ahead. The two major programs from a budgetary perspective are old-age 
pensions and health care. The following section presents a brief analysis of the potential costs 
and benefits of these programs under alternative scenarios.   
 
24. The aging of Azerbaijan’s population is already putting a strain on the country’s 
pension system. The pension system dependency rate is defined as the ratio of pensioners to 
contributors.  As of 2008, the pension system dependency rate in Azerbaijan was 83%, which is 
high compared to most countries in the ECA region.
7
  The main demographic trends shown in 
Figure 1—in particular, the expected decrease in the working-age population and increase in the 
elderly population—will add to the burden on the pension system. The World Bank’s Pension 
                                                 
7
 The average reported in the World Bank’s From Red to Gray report was 64% (Figure 4.1). 
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Reform Options Simulation Toolkit (PROST) was used to analyze the sustainability of 
Azerbaijan’s pay-as-you-go (PAYG) pension system.8 The PROST analysis used: (i) 
administrative data from the State Statistical Committee for demographic, labor market, and 
macroeconomic projections; and (ii) data on pension system indicators and parameters from the 
Social Protection Fund. The simulation assumed a stable coverage rate of pensions and no 
change in the retirement behavior (e.g., length of service at retirement). Given these assumptions, 
the simulation predicted a rising system dependency rate, which would surpass 100% by 2020 
(see Figure 133). 
 
 
 
In Azerbaijan, it is evident that there is a tradeoff between the financial sustainability of the 
pension system and provision of an adequate standard of living for pensioners. Currently, 
pensions are raised on an ad hoc basis, but rise at a rate higher than inflation. The PROST 
simulated four variants of indexation for the basic pension: (i) 100% indexation to inflation; (ii) 
100% indexation to the growth of the average wage; (iii) 50% indexation to inflation; and (iv) 
50% indexation to the average wage growth. The method of basic pension indexation has a 
dramatic effect on two major outcomes of Azerbaijan’s pension system.  These are: (i) the 
projected average replacement rate of pensions, defined as the ratio of average pension to 
average contributor wage; and (ii) the projected current balance of the pension system as a 
percentage of GDP. Indexation to inflation allows Azerbaijan’s government to attain a current 
surplus by 2015, but it implies a rapidly decreasing replacement rate, which approaches 10% by 
2050. On the other hand, indexation to average wage growth provides for more generous pension 
payments of about 30%-40% of the average wage—which are still modest by international 
                                                 
8
 The World Bank’s Pension Reform Options Simulation Toolkit (PROST) is a computer-based toolkit used to 
simulate pension systems over the course of time. It has been used in over 90 countries.  It is flexible enough to 
evaluate and compare different reform options in terms of their effects on system sustainability, levels of retirement 
income, and government liabilities. 
0%
20%
40%
60%
80%
100%
120%
140%
Old Age Total BeneficiariesSource: PROST
Figure 13: Projected System Dependency Rate in Azerbaijan, 2007-2050 
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standards
9
.  However, this comes at a high cost of a deteriorating current deficit in the pension 
system, which nears 4% of GDP by the end of the projection period (see  
Figure 14).  
 
Figure 14: Pension Indicators in Azerbaijan, by Indexation Method 
a) Average Replacement Rate (average pension as % of average contributor wage) of 
Combined Pension (Basic + Insurance) 
 
b) Current balance (% of GDP) of Combined Pension (Basic + Insurance) 
 
 
 
                                                 
9
 The lowest gross replacement rate among OECD countries was 35% (for Ireland), whereas OECD countries in the 
ECA region—The Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, and the Slovak Republic—had replacement rates of 50%-76% 
(OECD 2011).  
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25. Pensions are an important source of income for many households in Azerbaijan—and 
a significant buffer against poverty. Policies that lower the real value of pensions run the risk 
of resulting in a substantial increase in the overall poverty rate. Pensioners account for about 
one out of every eight Azerbaijanis, but—due to a high level of multi-generational living—about 
43% of all households in the country include at least one pensioner. In 2008, pensions made up 
about 19% of household expenditures in households with a pensioner. Based on 2008 data, it has 
been estimated that the overall poverty rate would increase by 7.5 percentage points (or 40%), to 
26.4%, in the absence of old-age pension transfers. Figure 15 shows that, indeed, the poverty rate 
of the elderly rises the most in the absence of pensions, but the poverty rate of children also 
increases substantially (by 6 percentage points).  
 
Figure 15: Poverty Impact of Pensions in Azerbaijan 
 
 
 
26. Another potential policy lever to maintain the sustainability of the pension system is the 
contribution rate—however, this lever might not be very effective in Azerbaijan, because the 
pension contribution rate is already fairly high at 25%. Covered employees pay 3% of their 
gross earnings as a contribution to the pension system; employers pay 22% of their payroll. The 
total contribution rate puts Azerbaijan in the middle of the pack with respect to other ECA 
countries.  However, it is still high by OECD standards, where the average pension contribution 
rate in 2009 was 20% (OECD 2011). Thus, although raising labor taxes might bring in additional 
revenues in the short-term, it could also discourage participation in the formal labor market in the 
medium-term, thus exacerbating future pension deficits.  
 
27. In sum, Azerbaijan’s pension system is already in deficit, and any future reforms 
would need to strike a difficult balance between providing retirees with an adequate standard 
of living and maintaining fiscal sustainability of the pension system. 
 
28. Concerns about cost pressures in the health sector also arise frequently in the context 
of aging populations.  Older people are typically in worse health, and therefore require more 
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medical care. In Azerbaijan, the 50+ age group spends on average 80% more on health than the 
18-49 age group.
10
 As the population ages, overall health spending should rise.   
 
29. However, international literature suggests that population aging is typically not the 
major driver of health spending increases over the course of time. While an aging population 
does contribute to rising health costs, it happens only gradually.  Thus, it cannot explain the 
significant increases in health expenditures over the course of time that are common around the 
world. There are more significant factors—in particular, the adoption of new technologies and 
the expansion of insurance coverage. These can be viewed as “age-specific” costs—in other 
words, these factors can drive up the amount that will be spent on a 65-year old in five years 
compared to the amount that is spent on a 65-year old today. These factors may be particularly 
important in Azerbaijan during the years ahead, because at present not all persons have full 
coverage, and the availability of technologies (e.g., to treat cardiovascular disease and cancer) is 
well behind Europe and the U.S. However, unlike aging-related costs, age-specific expenditures 
are very much amenable to policy influence: judicious expansions of insurance programs and 
benefit packages can help ensure that cost increases are manageable within the available budget.   
 
30. Several simple projections are laid out in Figure 16 that illustrate the potential impact 
of aging and other factors on future health care costs in Azerbaijan  In 2010, government 
spending on health in Azerbaijan was 2.8% of (non-oil) GDP.  If medical spending per person 
rises at the same rate as GDP until 2030, health spending will increase to 3.5% of GDP—due to 
the impact of population aging.  If, however, age-specific factors such as technology and 
insurance cause medical spending per person to increase at a rate of 1 or 2 percentage points 
faster than GDP, government health spending would increase to 4.3% or 5.2% of GDP, 
respectively.  Therefore, age-specific factors are likely to be more important drivers of health 
spending increases in Azerbaijan going forward than the aging population per se.   
 
31. In sum, the impact of an aging population on health costs in Azerbaijan does not 
appear to threaten the system’s sustainability.  Age-specific drivers, such as insurance and 
technology, are more likely to be the cause of spending increases—but these factors can be 
managed through careful policy design. Moreover, government spending in Azerbaijan is among 
the lowest in the region—and in all of the scenarios presented above, health expenditures would 
remain below regional averages. 
 
32. Utilization rates of out-patient and in-patient care are lower among the poor.  Figure 17 
indicates that individuals in the richest quintile are more than three times as likely to visit out-
patient health care facilities than those in the poorest quintile—and nearly twice as likely to seek 
inpatient care. The poor are also significantly more likely to cite affordability as the reason for 
not seeking care. At present there are no health programs specifically targeted to the poor in 
Azerbaijan.  In addition to improving access, a stronger targeting effort would also help lower 
out-of-pocket payments for the poor, without imposing the same fiscal burden as universal 
coverage. 
 
                                                 
10
 These estimates are based on survey data that capture out-of-pocket spending, which represents about two-thirds 
of total health spending in Azerbaijan.  It is assumed that a similar spending-by-age differential applies to that 
portion of expenditures covered by the government.   
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Figure 16: Aging and Health Spending in Azerbaijan as % of GDP 
 
 
 
Figure 17: Health Utilization in Azerbaijan, by Quintile 
  
 
  
2.8%
3.5%
4.3%
5.2%
0.0%
1.0%
2.0%
3.0%
4.0%
5.0%
6.0%
2010 -
Actual
2030 -
Impact of aging 
only
2030 -
Health spending 
rises 1% point 
faster than GDP
2030 -
Health spending 
rises 2% points 
faster than GDP
%
 o
f 
G
D
P
Azerbaijan:
Aging and health spending as % of GDP
Source: WB estimates
0.0%
2.0%
4.0%
6.0%
8.0%
10.0%
12.0%
14.0%
16.0%
18.0%
20.0%
Quintile 1 Quintile 2 Quintile 3 Quintile 4 Quintile 5
% used out-patient care last 30 days % used hospital in last 12 months
Source: LSMS 2008
0.0%
10.0%
20.0%
30.0%
40.0%
50.0%
60.0%
70.0%
80.0%
90.0%
Quintile 1 Quintile 2 Quintile 3 Quintile 4 Quintile 5
among those with sickness who didn't seek care, % 
who did not because couldn't affordSource: LSMS 2008
20 
 
IV. Summary 
 
 
Currently, Armenia’s social spending is skewed towards the elderly.  This helps to alleviate old-
age poverty, but may give insufficient attention to the needs of the young, who will need to be 
increasingly more productive in order to sustain the growing ranks of the elderly in the future.   
 
33. This note aimed to provide an overview of demographic changes in Azerbaijan and 
their policy implications for poverty reduction and social spending. The growth of Azerbaijan’s 
population is expected to slow down and eventually come to a standstill between 2010 and 2050.  
This trend will be accompanied by a growing percentage of elderly persons and a rising total 
dependency ratio. The major cause of these changes is the continually decrease in the fertility 
rate.  
 
34. The note presented a number of policy issues associated with these demographic 
changes. Labor force participation in Azerbaijan is relatively high by international standards—
although somewhat lower among men as compared to some of its neighbors. Over the next 
decade, the total number of workers is expected to continue to rise, albeit at an ever-slower pace. 
This slowdown could be tempered or even reversed through proactive policies, such as raising 
the retirement age for women up to that of men, and providing outside dependent care options to 
enable current caregivers to enter the labor market. The persistently high unemployment rate in 
Azerbaijan indicates the need for faster job creation and investment in active labor market 
programs, such as job search assistance and training/re-training. Worker productivity could be 
enhanced through better quality education for the young, and opportunities for life-long learning 
for adults. The pension system is already suffering from a high dependency ratio—which brings 
into sharp focus the tradeoff between benefit size and the fiscal sustainability of the pension 
system. On the other hand, the fiscal sustainability of the health system in its current form does 
not appear to be under threat from demographic changes: indeed, more resources should be 
directed toward expanding access to care and reducing the out-of-pocket expenditures of the 
poor. 
 
35.  Potential topics for further analytical work that emerge from the foregoing discussions 
may include: (i) early childhood development and life-long learning programs for enhancing 
labor force participation and labor productivity; (ii) the labor market impacts of targeted social 
assistance (TSA) as well as pensions—given their relatively high generosity; (iii) the labor 
productivity and poverty reduction impacts of rural infrastructure investments; and (iv) the 
linkages between health status and labor force participation.   
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